Bomdila

The telegram arrived with the message, Havildar Bangshi Singh is under treatment at Tezpur Military Hospital for bullet wounds, desires your presence. Delivered to his elder brother, an employee of the Government of Assam, at Shillong…………..

The long standing tension between India and China over the demarcation of the Himalayan frontier came to a head on October 20, 1962 with a massive offensive by Chinese forces both in the Ladakh area of North eastern Kashmir and across the McMahon line in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA)………….

Che Dong was no prominent land mark, or a feature of tactical importance. It was merely a cluster of herder’s huts built by Monpa tribesmen of the region. The huts lay a short distance from the spot where the boundaries of Tibet, Bhutan and India met,on the western most tip of the McMahon line, where the 33rd corps commanded by the respected Lt General Umrao Singh,on February 24, 1962, had ordered setting up of a post at the tri junction itself, among nine other posts. The Assam Rifles detachment that went to set up the post found the site unsuitable owing to its altitude and inaccessibility and instead selected Che Dong that lay on the lower slopes of a mountain range (called Tsangdhor), lying eastwards from the series of mountains that formed the tri-junction. It faced another mountain ridge (Thag La ridge) which was on a higher altitude, both ridges separated by a mountain stream, called Namka Chu, the source of which lay in north west of Che Dong among a cluster of lakes, ran a length of about 26 Kilometres in deep boulder strewn bed and dropped sharply by the time it neared another post, the Khinjemane post. The river valley was thickly wooded, movement was difficult, which was to become the theatre of a fierce battle as the conflict grew. Positioned thus on a lower altitude, the post was most vulnerable and served no tactical purpose for the Army. The post became erroneously famous as Dhola Post, established by Captain Mahabir Prasad of 1 SIKH on June 4th, 1962. …….

While this post was being set up, Major General Niranjan Prasad, the General Officer Commanding, 4th Infantry Division, questioned the officer entrusted with the task of setting up the post as to why a site shown on the north of the McMahon line was selected.

Major General Prasad was unhappy about it and made several representations from the middle of July 1962 emphasizing that it should either be withdrawn or moved forward to a tactically sound position atop Thag La Ridge, if indeed it was Indian territory. The delayed response from the Defense Ministry via Army Headquarters came on 12 September, conveying that Thag La ridge was indeed Indian territory and the Army must exercise the Country’s rights over it. The decision came too late, by then, the Chinese were already atop Thag La Ridge in strengh, with regular Peoples Liberation Army front line troops. The Indian post at Che Dong, the Dhola post, lying at a lower plane was now most vulnerable to the Chinese attack.

As it was, Thag La was important to the Chinese too. A large Tibetan village lay on its northern slopes which was an obvious site for a Chinese forward base for any operations against India in this sector. Besides, there had been trouble over the ridge earlier.

On the North- East frontier, fierce fighting ensued lasting over 24 hours.The attack on the Namka Chu positions commenced in the early hours of 20th October at 05.45 hours, which was preceded by heavy bombardment. The Chinese had infiltrated through huge gaps in the Indian defenses, thus rendering it vulnerable and were attacking downhill from higher ground behind Indian defenses. The Indian defenders were thus forced to turn around and face the attack. The telephone lines which ran along the Namka Chu were also disabled during the night. Thus the Brigade HQ was rendered incommunicado with any of its Battalions. The main thrust of the attack was faced by 2nd Rajput which was already weakened by the Chinese infiltration. The casualties suffered bear testimony to the heroic fight put up by them against overwhelming odds. Against their overall strength of 513 inclusive of all ranks deployed on Namka Chu, 282 jawans laid down their lives in supreme sacrifice, 171 soldiers were taken prisoner, among whom 81 were wounded. The fierce battle left with a meager number of 60 survivors. The Chinese too suffered heavily, their casualties being manifold compared to the Indian losses, indicating the tough fight put up by the Indian soldiers. The battle had lasted for about three hours. Thus the much smaller Indian force belonging to the 7th infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigedier John P Dalvi was overwhelmed by the better equipped and much larger Chinese forces, who had attacked in at least Divisional strength( one division comprising about 10000 troops), and the two outposts of the Indian army, namely Dhola and near by Khinzemane post were overrun. ( Brigedier J P Dalvi was taken prisoner during the assault and saw the elaborate arrangements the Chinese had already made for keeping about 3000 prisoners, indicating their sinister designs on a full scale assault much before the conflict had actually taken place).

A word about the terrain……beyond Tawang, ponies, mules and porters were the only means of transport. To reach the Assam Rifles post at Che Dong, one had to traverse a route of about 5 Kilometres short of the distance upto the Namka Chu stream, climb further west up a length of about 3048 metres, whence a path led north across a mountain ridge of 4396 metres height to reach Che Dong. The last leg of this route ran along the north bank of Namka Chu stream, right under the Chinese positions on Thag La. The Indian troops were therefore compelled to use an alternative route later on, which was longer, tortuous and more difficult. Such were the adverse conditions, monumental to say the least, that the Indian troops had to overcome to defend and fight against a far better equipped enemy force, enduring a harsh bitter sub zero climate with chilling wind, clothing far less adequate to keep oneself warm against the biting cold, resulting in frostbite to many a soldiers……… “We endured the elements: strong winds, heavy rain, sun and snowfall. Our Angola shirt, jersey pullover, cotton trousers and rubber sole jungle boots were most inadequate to withstand the rigors, Often we slept on wet forest floor with crawly, creepy creatures for company. Most of us carried wounds of varying degrees, we had not a morsel of food since morning of 15 November”( So wrote Brigedier Kuldip Singh in his book ‘ Through Wars and Insurgency Diary of an Army Officer’).

During the next three days, the invasion by the Chinese developed into a massive offensive at both ends of the McMahon line, the west end bordering Bhutan and Tibet, and the extreme eastern end bordering Burma. In the west, they advanced six or seven miles south of Dhola, captured the stretegic Bum La pass between Tibet’s Cona county and India’s Tawang district and threatened to outflank Tawang, the most advanced forward base in this area, at the head of a jeep road reaching up to Tezpur town…………..

The Border Roads Organisation, set up in 1960, took over the task of road building in this sector, but it was impossible for the organisation to complete a task in two years that would normally take about twelve years. By September 1962, a one ton road was built up to Tawang from Tezpur. As it had to be laid across the grain of the southern Himalayas, it would take many years to settle down and was at the time fit only as a fair weather road. Monsoon rains had damaged it extensively, large chunks having been washed away. Taking a look at the hazardous terrain that this road traverses, one can only wonder at the tremendous difficulties the Army engineers had to face in building it. From the foot hills of the Himalayas, north of Misamari Army cantonment( near Tezpur), it climbed 2743 metres above sea level to reach a place called Eagle’s Nest, a further climb of about 200 metres to reach Bomdi La. There after there was a sharp drop to Dirang Dzong situated at 1676 metres below. Then began the ascent to Se La, perched at 4180 metres followed by a steep drop to Jang at 1524 metres and finally the climb to Tawang at 3048 metres.

The total distance from the foot hills was only about 291 kilometres but it took several days to cover it. Considering the necessity for acclimatization of troops inducted from the plains, quick reinforcement of the theatre was impracticable. Also, till then, no staging facilities ( an area where soldiers and military equipment etc are gathered for further transshipment to another place) had been provided on the route and there were no replenishment dumps for temporary rest and refreshment. In fact a journey to Tawang was a nightmare………..

At the time, the task of defending Tawang was entrusted to 7 Infantry Brigade. Though to defend Tawang was their primary responsibility, it was saddled with many a responsibilities that had no relationship at all with its capability, such as preventing any penetration of the McMahon line that stretched for about 150 Kilometres, setting up of and assistance to the Assam Rifles posts, building helipads and shelter homes for their own, tasks for which the Brigade was woefully inadequate. As it was at the time of the Che Dong incident, it had only two Infantry Battalions, 9 Punjab and 1 Sikh, both at Tawang. Its third Battalion, 1/9 Gorkha Rifles, was at Missamari, having completed its three year tenure at NEFA. The Battalion, earmarked to replace the Gorkhas, 4 Grenadiers, had not yet arrived at the time of the assault. Engaged thus, the training of 7 Brigade had been neglected, it had done no collective training since its arrival at NEFA………

…………The assault on Tawang commenced at 05.30 hours(IST) on 23rd oct, when preparations were on at the Army kitchen for tea. The 1 Sikh Platton under Subedar Joginder Singh, PVC (posthumous) stood rock like for the counter attack. They fought fiercely inflicting heavy casualties overwhelming the enemy with their ferocity . However, in no time the enemy unleashed another attack with more power and troops. The battle field resounded with the war cry,” JoBole So Nihaal, Sat Sri Akaal”. Sub Joginder Singh was aware that he had few men and ammunition but kept the morale of his troops high to fight with the enemy head on. The final assault by the Chinese was more forceful and by this time he lost most of his men, himself being badly injured. The ammunition also was completely exhausted. With raw courage and seething anger, Sub Joginder Singh and the few men that remained alive, jumped out of their bunker with the war cry,” JoBole So Nihaal, Sat Sri Akaal”, bayonets fixed on their guns, fell upon the enemy killing as many. Covered with blankets of snow, he lay on the battle ground, very badly injured and was captured as a POW. Subeder Joginder Singh was later awarded the highest gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra for his devotion to duty, inspiring leadership and bravery of the highest order. The Chinese, having come to know about the award being conferred upon him, returned his ashes as a mark of respect for this brave soldier………..

Tawang fell…….

The Chinese, in addition to their great superiority in both manpower and firepower, had the added advantage both geographically and logistically, (1) they were attacking downwards from mountain heights, whereas the Indian forces had to defend uphill, (2) as the Chinese military buildup had been in progress for a long period, to the utter ignorance and complacency of the Indian side, they were much better acclimatized to the bitter cold, atmospheric conditions and the mountainous terrain than the Indian forces, who had had much lesser reaction time to condition themselves to the harsh cold mountainous terrain and adverse climate, (3) as regards transport, the Chinese were within reasonable reach of their bases at Tibet through a network of military roads up to the MacMahon line, whereas the Indian troops in forward areas had to depend for supplies on air drops by transport planes, and also on chains of mules carrying supply bags on their backs, had the added disadvantage of arms and artillery that were much antiquated in comparison. Despite all the disadvantages, the defensive assault was fierce, in frontal attack, taking whatever natural cover the terrain would provide, confronting enemy bullets, burning anger and intense desire to kill the enemy paramount. And so the battle raged, Chinese soldiers killed in huge numbers, but the enemy continued to assault in human waves, ignoring the heavy casualties they suffered.

In the east, a heavy attack was launched on the border post of Kibitu, 20 miles from the Burmese frontier, while in the centre of the McMahon line, the Chinese forces were active in the Longju area and were actually in occupation of the border post of Longju itself.

Meanwhile in the eastern sector the Chinese had overrun Kibitu post and were pushing towards Walong, 15 miles south of the frontier, a small hamlet, situated in the tri junction of Tibet, Myanmar and India, lying astride the ancient trade route. Fierce fighting took place at the approaches towards Walong, about 60 70 Chinese soldiers died in that attack and four Indian soldiers were killed including the Vir Chakra awardee Naik Bahadur Singh who took over the light machine gun (LMG) after his LMG detachment was killed, and kept firing till he was hit in the chest………. ……….The position of the Brigade defending Walong on the morning of 16 Nov was truly untenable, though the Brigade fought and repelled wave after wave of Chinese assaults, into which about 20000 troops were thrown. Lt General B M Kaul, GOC IV Corps was in Walong since 15 Nov and had seen the situation first hand. The Brigade Commander had recommended withdrawal to the Corps Commander, but Lt.Gen B.M.Kaul was most reluctant. He as the Chief of the General Staff at Army HQ was in a dilemma, being an accomplice to the politicians and bureaucrats who had formulated the ‘Forward Policy’ and in issuance of the order to ‘throw the Chinese out’. He refused to order withdrawal, tactical logic of the Brigade Commander and hopelessness of the situation notwithstanding. Thereupon, the Brigade Commander accepted his command to continue fighting despite the fruitless situation, with the condition that the Lt Gen would continue to stay at Walong and conveyed in no uncertain terms that he would not allow him to take off in his aircraft. Thereupon Lt Gen B M Kaul agreed to permit withdrawal and offered Brigadier Rawlley a lift in his aircraft back to safety. The Brigadier politely refused and set into motion the process of withdrwal of his Brigade or what was left of it to Hayuliang, at a distance of 105 KM from Walong. Walong fell on Nov’18, and by capturing Walong, the chinese gained control of the most advanced and forward airstrip in this area and left the Indian side more than 100 mile away from their supply lines and imperilled the entire Indian position at the eastern end of the border.

Towang, 16 miles south of the McMahon line fell to the Chinese on October 25. The local population of about 300 having being evacuated beforehand, including the Abbot and monks of the monastery, a major Buddhist religious center, known to have given shelter to the Dalai Lama during his escape from Tibet in 1959…………..

The assault by the enemy continued undeterred, attacking in great strength south of Towang outflanking the Indian division holding the 14,000-ft Se-La pass. While the Chinese, estimated at four Brigades, launched a frontal attack on the pass itself, another large force carried out a pincer movement (a military attack by two coordinated forces that close in on an enemy position from different directions ) far to the south which succeeded in cutting off the only road linking Se La pass with the key defense center of Bomdila, 32 miles to the south as the crow flies, but 80 miles by a tortuous road over the mountains. As a result the Se-La pass was rendered untenable as a defense position, it’s defenders were faced with a fighting withdrawal down a valley already cut by the chinese; and Bomdila was itself seriously threatened, the road having been cut at a point near the town. ………….

Havildar Bangshi Singh, driving his Willys Army jeep, was carrying the grievously bullet ridden Commanding officer as the Indian side fightingly withdrew from the war front with the fall of Tawang, the enemy advancing right behind in huge human waves.The one ton jeep road that the vehicle was traversing, sharply descending from high mountains was in a tattered condition, huge chunks of broken parts rendering the road almost unserviceable by the monsoon rainfalls that raged in recent past. The descent was slow, maneuverability being almost impossible. The enemy was almost on their back, the jeep being within firing range. A heavy burst of gunfire almost engulfed the vehicle, hot burning bullets hitting the legs, arms and abdomen of Bangshi Singh, who had taken the hits upon himself as he furiously attempted to save his commanding officer, who was already semi-conscious and was in a state of coma. Bolts of searing pain engulfed his body and brain, numbing his mobility, but the call of duty was paramount. He had to, he must save his commanding officer, he must remain alert, and so he resolutely diverted his attention to the task in hand, driving the vehicle with absolute caution, somehow ignoring the bleeding and white hot burning pain. The jeep was now climbing up a winding tortuous dilapidated road until it reached a place called Se La. By now, Havildar Bangshi Singh, having bled immensely, numbing pain engulfing his entire psyche, had almost lost whatever reserve strength he was mustering. But their destination to the Army Hospital at Missamari was still far away. Human reservoir of inner strength, when summoned with resolute will power at times of calamity are immense and runs deep. And so did Bangshi Singh, as he held on to his last ounce of resolve, shaking off the compelling desire to go to sleep and blissful unconsciousness. Now the descent along the almost nonexistent road was steep, Intermittent gunfire at a distance echoed through the mountains, getting louder and louder with every passing hour.By the time they reached Bomdila, pitch black darkness set in,night had fallen. It was impossible to separate the hours, the small town engulfed in total darkness, little simmering lamps being darkened with thick coverings. The descent from Bomdila in the pitch black darkness, save and except the headlights of the jeep, was dangerous and hazardous, a bit of careless turn on the tattered, broken road would be enough for the jeep to tumble down deep below into the thick cavernous darkness. The driver, by now beyond fatigue, beyond pain and numbness, sanity held with a single thread of consciousness, attention consumed utterly on the steering wheel, slithered down through the darkness, and reached the plains of the valley as the first light of dawn peeked in the horizon.

The military hospital was agog with activity, truckloads of wounded, bullet ridden soldiers were everywhere, many of whom incapacitated with frostbite, uniformed hospital staff separating the wounded according to the severity of each, shifting on to stretchers, the dead being carried away separately! Havildar Bangshi Singh, by now almost dead, was dimly aware of people shouting as if in a distant dream as he stopped and lay unconscious.

Tezpur town was in chaos………

“Huge Chinese armies have been marching in the northern part of NEFA. We have had reverses at Walong, Se La and today Bomdila, a small town in NEFA, has also fallen. We shall not rest till the invader goes out of India or is pushed out. I want to make that clear to all of you, and, especially our countrymen in Assam, to whom our heart goes out at this moment.”

These words belonged to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, as he addressed the nation on All India Radio on November 20th, 1962, while the Sino India war raged on. “There is a sense of emptiness. He must have been the unhappiest man in India today, seeing that all he has built on the basis of peace with China crumbling. His household reports that he is quieter than usual, keeping his thoughts to himself, often in a reverie and sometimes trembling.”( excerpts from Kuldip Nayar’s book ‘Between the lines’ published in 1969 by Konark Publishers).

A wave of panic swept across Tezpur, a town on the northern banks of the river Brahmaputra, as the Prime Minister said “my heart goes out to the people of Assam”. Bomdila, about 150 km north of Tezpur had fallen to the Chinese, and there was every possibility that the invaders were heading towards Tezpur.

This speech made people of Assam feel abandoned. It was like being let down by their own Government. At a time when even the Prime Minister appeared helpless, what was going to be their fate!

Rumour spread through out Tezpur that the Indian soldiers were suffering reverses in the frontier and swathes of areas were overrun and occupied by the Chinese. Army presence in and around Tezpur were everywhere. People got alarmed, started leaving in whatever means available, by bus, car, cart, truck, on cycle and even on foot, towards the ferry ghat on the banks of Brahmaputra, in the chilling November month, there was no bridge on the river in those times. and then came the address by the Prime Minister. People panicked, Chinese armies marching into Tezpur anytime seemed very imminent, people in hundreds thronged the ferry ghat waiting for the few steamers to take them onto relatively safer banks on the other side at Silghat.

With the fall of Bomdila and advance of the Chinese forces southward, the wives and families of mostly Scottish and British, working in the oilfields and tea plantations of northern Assam hurriedly left, abandoning their gardens under care of native staff, leaving behind their escorting vehicles with keys in the ignition at the small airport itself, at Salonibari, availing the limited air service to and from Calcutta.By Nov 20 and on succeeding days, about 650 were evacuated in 48 hours, as well as the families of American baptist churches working in the area. It is said that the local Administration too had deserted the town, the DC having left to Calcutta by air along with his families, but then those were turbulent times, many a rumor were afloat!

The Tezpur branch of the State Bank of India piled up bundles of currency notes along with stamp papers and consigned everything to flames in a bonfire, huge sacks of coins of all denominations were dumped in the nearby Podum Pukhuri pond, lest the currency might fall into the hands of the invaders………..

With the fall of Bomdila, an eerie silence descended on the small town as the panic stricken local populace, old and young, women and children, frail and feeble thronged in hundreds on the bank of the Mighty Brahmaputra in the chilling cold, waiting for the ferry to carry them on the other side, lighting up camp fires at night during the long wait. Not that everyone left, some bold and brave men stayed behind, organizing groups of volunteers, to defend their beloved town with whatever means that could be gathered, a town that became a ghost town!! The inmates of Tezpur jail, the prisoners were all set free as well as those from the mental hospital, who ran around the abandoned town half dressed and even naked, shouting and hollering in sheer delight!

…………Prelude to the Chinese invasion started unraveling three years earlier when the entire Tezpur township woke up to welcome the Dalai Lama’s entourage in 1959 at a huge gathering at Darrang College ground. The Tibetan refugees were sheltered in camps at Missamari, some 45 minutes drive from Tezpur. The local populace went out of their way to make the Tibetan refugee’s stay comfortable, Mahila Samities stitching ‘Bakhus'( traditional dress of Tibetan women), preparing food packets and other essentials, little knowing that the dark clouds of war would befall the township three years hence as a sequel to such events!…………

On 19th November’62, China declared an unilateral ceasefire to take effect from midnight of 21st November, withdrawing its troops up to positions 20 kilometres(12 miles) behind the line of control that existed between India and China as on 7th November 1959, bringing down curtains on a bloody war, a war that left an indelible scar on the Indian psyche for generations to come, an ignominy that Indians had to painfully bear for a long time, not for the brave Indian soldiers, who had sparkled like bright stars in extreme adverse conditions, but for short sightedness and utter complacency of the people at the helms, who had blissfully ignored the gathering war clouds that brewed since 1959………. …………In an alternative scenario, with a strong and well equipped army in position to defend the borders, with a capable chain of command to depend on, terrain negotiated with timely expertise, proper intel to guide the army along, the scenario would have been altogether different, we would have basked in its glory to recite to our future generations! But then it is only a wishful thinking!!

At the time Peking announced a cease fire, the ground military situation at NEFA was as follows: (1) at the eastern end of the border the Chinese had captured Walong, and advanced 10 to 15 miles southward and were less than 100 miles from the Digboi oil fields of North East Assam,(2) at the western end of the border the chinese had advanced more than 100 miles south of the McMahon line and reached almost the plains of Assam, the advance being halted some 40 miles north of the Brahmaputra and about the same distance from Tezpur, from where the Army HQ rs were shifted to Gauhati.

Over 18000 civilian evacuees had arrived in Assam by the end of November from Kameng, Lohit,Suwansiri, and Siang frontier divisions of NEFA. They were housed in temporary camps at Gauhati, Dibrugarh, Nowgong, Mangaldoi, Tezpur and North Lakhimpur…..

Some Lesser Known Facts:

• The Indo China war that began on 20th Oct’62, saw a month long standoff between 10,000-20,000 Indian troops and 80,000 Chinese troops:
• India firmly believed that the war began with the Chinese onslaught, while China insisted that it was a repercussion of India’s ‘forward policy’ which had sought setting up of military outposts in areas claimed by the Chinese.
• MaoSeTung(Mau Zedung) had reportedly told a Nepalese delegation in 1964 that the ‘major problem between India and China was not the McMahon Line, but the Tibetan question’. In 1973, Zhou Enlai (the then Chinese Prime Minister) was to tell Kissinger (the then Secretary of State of USA) that the conflict took place because Nehru(Indian PM) was getting ‘cocky’.
• The Chinese attack on the borders was very well planned as was evident from the fact that, ” the Chinese attack began simultaneously in all sectors of the border, both in the west and the east, at the same time- 5 am (IST) on 20th Oct’1962- completely synchronized as per Beijing time”.
• Where was Nehru and Krishna Menon??………Defense Minister Krishna Menon had left for New York on 12 Sept’62 to attend the UN General Assembly and only returned on 30th ‘Sept’62. Even PM Nehru had left on 8th’Sept to attend Common Wealth Prime Minister’s conference returning on 2nd’Oct, only to leave again on 12 Oct for Colombo and returned on 16th October’62. Even Lt Gen B.M.Kaul, the Chief of General Staff was on holiday in Kashmir till 2nd Oct’62, while the Director of Military Operations was on a cruise on the Aircraft Carrier Vikrant.
• Prime Minister Nehru had sought American assistance and requested President J F Kennedy to provide India 12 Squadrons of Fighter Jets and a modern Radar system, the letter personally hand delivered by the then Indian Ambassador. It was reported in a book by Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer, ‘JFK’S Forgotten Crises: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War’ that the then President Kennedy even offered India $500 Million as Military assistance, but the plan did not go through because of Kennedy’;s assassination.
• Havildar Bangshi Singh was released from hospital after about three months with a prominent limp in his right leg…the Commanding officer regained consciousness but remained a hospital inmate at the time of Bangshi Singh’s release.

It was in the backdrop of 1962 war that Lata Mangeshkar sang the song ‘Ae Mere Watan ke Logon‘, composed by C Ramachandra and written by Pradeep, on Republic Day, the 26th January 1963, just after three months of end of the war, at the Ramlila ground, New Delhi. Prime Minister Nehru, who was in attendance, was brought to tears listening to Lata’s rendition of the song.